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The Law of Transboundary Aquifers: Many Ways of Going Forward, but 
Only One Way of Standing Still 
 
Gabriel Eckstein and Francesco Sindico 
 
The international community has been considering international legal norms and policies 
for the management of transboundary aquifers for more than ten years. In 2008, the  
International Law Commission provided a framework with the adoption of the Draft Articles 
on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, which are now formally annexed to a United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution. Since 2008, the topic of the law of 
transboundary aquifers has thrice been placed on the agenda of the UNGA Sixth Committee 
with a specific mandate to discuss the future form of the Draft Articles. This article explores 
the options before the international community regarding the future form of the Draft 
Articles and considers the possible advantages and disadvantages of each option. The 
article also discusses the extent to which the actual form of the Draft Articles matters in 
itself, or whether the impact of the Draft Articles ultimately will depend on other factors. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Groundwater resources play a critical role in providing fresh water for people, industries, 
nations and the environment worldwide. Globally, groundwater provides approximately 45% 
RIKXPDQLW\¶V IUHVKZDWHUQHHGV IRU HYHU\GD\ domestic uses, such as drinking, cooking and 
hygiene, as well as 24% of water used in irrigated agriculture.1 In many cases, groundwater is 
found in aquifers that are transboundary.2 While 276 international watercourses traverse the 
ZRUOG¶VODQGDUHDV3 an ongoing study has identified, to date, 448 aquifers and aquifer bodies 
traversing international political boundaries.4 In places like the Middle East, North Africa, 
and the Mexico-United States (US) border, transboundary aquifers serve as the primary or 
sole source of available freshwater for human and environmental sustenance. 
 
Recognizing the particular importance of transboundary aquifers, nations and international 
agencies around the world have begun exploring mechanisms for governing these hidden 
resources. This includes formal efforts to manage and regulate transboundary aquifers, such 
as the rigorous scheme implemented on the Genevese Aquifer along the French-Swiss 
border,5 to more general cooperative regimes, such as the Guarani Aquifer Agreement in 
South America,6 to instruments aimed mainly at an initial exchange of scientific data, as 
                                                          
1 J. Margat and J. van der Gun, Groundwater Around the World: A Geographic Synopsis (CRC Press 2013), at 
149. 
2 It is important to highlight that groundwater is just one component of an aquifer; an aquifer is the geological 
formation that contains the groundwater. According to the International Law Commission Draft Articles on the 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers, an aquifer is µa permeable water bearing geological formation underlain by a 
less permeable layer and the water contained in the saturated zone of the formation¶. The Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers (UNGA Resolution A/RES/63/124, 11 December 2008), Article 2a. 
3 P. Wouters and R. Moynihan, µBenefit Sharing in the UN Watercourses Convention and under International 
water law¶, in: F. Rocha Loures and A. Rieu-Clarke (eds.), The UN Watercourses Convention in Force: 
Strengthening International Law for Transboundary Water Management (Routledge, 2013), 336. 
4 See IGRAC, µTransboundary Aquifers of the World ± Update 2012, Special Edition for the 6th World Water 
Forum, Marseille¶, found at: <http://www.un-igrac.org/dynamics/modules/SFIL0100/view.php?fil_Id=213>. 
5 Convention Relative a la Protection, a l¶8tilisation, a la Realimentation et au Suivi de la Nappe Souterraine 
Franco-Suisse du Genevois (18 December 2007; in force 1 January 2008). 
6 Acuerdo Sobre el Acuífero Guarani (San Juan, Argentina, 2 August 2010; not yet in force), µGuarani Aquifer 
Agreement¶ $Q (QJOLVK YHUVLRQ RI WKH $JUHHPHQW FDQ EH found at: 
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Guarani_Aquifer_Agreement-English.pdf>. 
developed for the Nubian Sandstone and North Western Sahara aquifer systems in Northern 
Africa.7 It also includes informal efforts forged by subnational political entities, like the 
unofficial arrangements crafted for the Hueco Bolson aquifer underlying the cities of Juárez 
and El Paso on the Mexico-US border,8 and for the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer between the 
US state of Washington and the Canadian province of British Columbia.9 
 
Possibly the most significant global effort to address the governance of transboundary 
aquifers is that undertaken by the United Nations (UN) International Law Commission (ILC). 
In December 2008, following six years of intense research and debate, the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution 63/124, which contains nineteen Draft Articles on the 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers.10 Prepared by the ILC, the Draft Articles were modelled, 
largely, on the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention (UNWC).11 Since 2008, the Draft Articles 
have thrice been on the agenda of the UN General Assembly for the purpose of discussing the 
future form of the principles and norms articulated LQ WKH ,/&¶VZRUNSURGXFW. In 2008 and 
2011, the topic was tabled for consideration at subsequent meetings. In October and 
November 2013, the Draft Articles were again raised at the UNGA and their status and final 
form considered. While the member States gave the topic considerable attention, they again 
failed to form a consensus on whether and how to move the topic forward. 
 
This article explores the options available for the future form of the Draft Articles and 
considers the advantages and disadvantages of each possibility. It also considers the extent to 
which that final form may matter for the development or codification of international law, 
and whether the impact of the Draft Articles could depend on other factors. The article begins 
by reviewing the work of the ILC in developing the Draft Articles. It then analyses the 
various options for their future form that have been proffered by various governments, 
scholars, and international organizations, including as an independent treaty, a protocol to the 
UNWC, and a statement of guidelines. In this context, it also considers the impact of 
maintaining the status quo, meaning no action by the UN General Assembly. Finally, the 
article assesses the relationship between the future form of the Draft Articles and their 
relevance to the future development and codification of international law for transboundary 
aquifers. 
 
                                                          
7 The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System underlies the territories of Chad, Egypt, Libya and Sudan. See 
Programme for the Development of a Regional Strategy for the Utilisation of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer 
System (NSAS) ± Terms of Reference for the Monitoring and Exchange of Groundwater Information of the 
Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (Tripoli, 5 October 2000), found at: 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/y5739e/y5739e05.htm>. The North Western Sahara Aquifer System underlies 
Algeria, Libya and Tunisia. See Establishment of a Consultation Mechanism for the Northwestern Sahara 
Aquifer System (SASS) (Rome, 19-20 December; endorsed 6 January 2003 (Algeria), 15 February 2003 
(Tunisia), 23 February 2003 (Libya)), found at: 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/y5739e/y5739e05.htm#bm05.2.1>. 
8 Memorandum of Understanding between City of Juárez, Mexico Utilities and the El Paso Water Utilities 
Public Services Board of the City of El Paso, Texas (6 December 1999), found at: 
<http://internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Local-GW-Agreements/El_Paso-Juarez_MoU.pdf>. 
9 Memorandum of Agreement Related to Referral of Water Right Applications Related to the Transboundary 
Abbotsford±Sumas Aquifer between the State of Washington as Represented by the Department of Ecology and 
the Province of British Columbia as Represented by the Minister of Environment, Lands and Parks (10 October 
1996), found at: <http://internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Local-GW-Agreements/1996-BC-
WA-Water-Right-Referral-Agreement.pdf>. 
10 UNGA Resolution A/RES/63/124, n. 2 above. 
11 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (New York, 21 May 
QRW\HWLQIRUFHµ81:&¶ 
THE LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS 
 
Historically, groundwater resources were treated by nations, water law scholars, and 
practitioners akin to an unwanted stepchild. They were either ignored, cursorily 
misunderstood, or intentionally disregarded, resulting in their omission from public and 
political discourse and consideration. This was especially true in the international 
transboundary context, where the number of international agreements for transboundary 
rivers and lakes continues to vastly outnumber those applicable to transboundary aquifers.12 
 
The earliest articulation of an international legal regime specifically applicable to these 
transboundary ground water resources is found in the work of the International Law 
Association in its so-called Helsinki Rules of 1966 and Seoul Rules of 1986.13 While the 
product of an unofficial, non-governmental organization, the norms articulated in its 
instruments have been recognized as foundational for subsequent efforts. More recently, the 
UNWC indirectly adopted some of the notions put forward by the International Law 
Association, when it applied its proposed regime to transboundary aquifers that were 
hydraulically connected to transboundary rivers or lakes.14 That latter effort, though, was not 
comprehensive and left numerous gaps in the management and regulatory regime applicable 
to transboundary aquifers.15 
 
In 2002, at the request of the UNGA, the ILC began working on the topic of µshared natural 
resources¶. While the effort was conceptualized to encompass water, oil, gas and other natural 
resources that traversed international political boundaries, in 2003 the ILC decided to confine 
its initial work to the subject of transboundary ground water resources. Its objective was to 
build on its prior work on transboundary watercourses (which resulted in the UNWC), and to 
address those transboundary aquifers that were excluded under the UNWC. Under this 
mandate, the ILC elected Ambassador Chusei Yamada of Japan as its Special Rapporteur for 
the topic and embarked on a rigorous study of the law, science and policy of transboundary 
aquifers globally.16 
 
                                                          
12 G. Eckstein and Y. Eckstein, µA Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground Water Resources and 
International Law¶, 19:2 American University International Law Review (2003), 222. In contrast to the handful 
of transboundary aquifer agreements currently in force (all of which were forged in the past 35 years), more than 
3,600 treaties governing transboundary rivers and lakes have been implemented over the past 1,200 years. 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements, United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2002), at 6. 
13 International Law Association, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, in: 
Report of the Fifty-Second Conference (August 1966), 484, Article II; and International Law Association, The 
Seoul Rules on International Groundwaters, in: Report of the Sixty-Second Conference (August 1986). 
14 UNWC, n. 11 above, Article 2(a). 
15 Gaps in the UNWC, as it applies to ground water reVRXUFHV LQFOXGH WKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶V QRQ-applicability to 
transboundary fossil aquifers and, more generally, to transboundary aquifers without a hydraulic link to a 
transboundary surface water body. See G. Eckstein, µA Hydrogeological Perspective of the Status of Ground 
Water Resources Under the UN Watercourse Convention¶, 30:3 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 
(2005), 529. The ILC sought, at least, to partly bridge this gap through the adoption of the 1994 ILC Resolution 
on Confined Transboundary Groundwater, which can be found in: Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1994, Volume II, Part 2 (UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l, 1994), 135. This effort, though, has 
been criticized as both inadequate and technically imprecise. See C. Yamada, Shared Natural Resources: 
Addendum to the First Report on Outlines (UN Doc. A/CN.4/533/Add.1, 30 June 2003), at paragraph 5; and G. 
Eckstein and Y. Eckstein, n. 12 above, 251. 
16 2QWKHSURFHVVDW WKH,/&DQGLWVZRUNRQWKHODZRIWUDQVERXQGDU\DTXLIHUVVHH506WHSKDQ µ7KH'UDIW
$UWLFOHVRQ WKH/DZRI7UDQVERXQGDU\$TXLIHUV7KH3URFHVVDW WKH81,/&¶:3 International Community 
Law Review (2011), 223. 
In late 2008, following six years of intense research and debate, and five reports and 
supplements prepared by Ambassador Yamada, the UN General Assembly adopted a 
resolution containing nineteen Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers.17 The resolution 
recognized the work of the ILC, and commended the Draft Articles µto the attention of 
Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate 
action¶.18 It also expressed its appreciation to the UNESCO International Hydrological 
Programme (UNESCO-IHP), which had been instrumental in providing scientific and 
technical assistance to the ILC and the Special Rapporteur.19 In addition, it encouraged µthe 
States concerned to make appropriate bilateral or regional arrangements for the proper 
management of their transboundary aquifers, taking into account the provisions of these draft 
articles¶.20 Finally, it placed the topic of the law of transboundary aquifers on its provisional 
meeting agenda three years hence.21 
 
Since that initial consideration, the law of transboundary aquifers has been discussed by the 
UNGA¶VSixth Committee on two occasions, in 2011 and 2013. In both sessions, while some 
delegates offered substantive comments on the Draft Articles, the primary focus was on their 
final form. Some delegates favoured commencing deliberation on a binding treaty, either 
immediately or in a stepped fashion. Other argued that codification was premature because of 
a lack of State practice evidencing the status of the international law of transboundary 
aquifers. Still others, while sceptical of the state of international law on the subject, suggested 
adopting the Draft Articles in the form of a resolution or declaration of principles that could 
serve as guidelines as States explore their applicability in bilateral or regional agreements.22 
 
In 2011, the UNGA took note of the importance of µthe need for reasonable and proper 
management of transboundary aquifers¶, further encouraged the member States µto make 
appropriate bilateral or regional arrangements for the proper management of their 
transboundary aquifers, taking into account the provisions of the draft articles¶,23 and tabled 
consideration of the final form of the Draft Articles to its meeting in 2013.24 UNESCO-IHP 
was referred to specifically and encouraged µto offer further scientific and technical 
assistance to the States concerned¶.25 
 
The discussions before the UNGA in late 2013 did not differ significantly from those of prior 
deliberations. Countries continued to disagree over the status to be given to the Draft Articles 
and over their future form. Despite the discord, the UNGA agreed, once more, to postpone 
                                                          
17 On the Draft Articles, VHH . 0HFKOHP µ0RYLQJ $KHDG LQ 3URWHFWLQJ )UHVKZDWHU 5HVRXUFHV 7KH
,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V 'UDIW $UWLFOHV RQ 7UDQVERXQGDU\ $TXLIHUV¶ :4 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2009), 801 6 0F&DIIUH\ µ7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ $GRSWV Draft Articles on 
7UDQVERXQGDU\ $TXLIHUV¶ :2 American Journal of International Law (2009), 72; and G. Eckstein, 
µ&RPPHQWDU\ RQ WKH 81 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ
V 'UDIW $UWLFOHV RQ WKH /DZ RI 7UDQVERXQGDU\
$TXLIHUV¶:3 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy (2007), 537. 
18 UNGA Resolution A/RES/63/124, n. 2 above.paragraph 4. 
19 Ibid., at paragraph 3. 
20 Ibid., at paragraph 5 (emphasis added). 
21 Ibid., at paragraph 6. 
22 For a review of the 2013 session, see below. See also UNGA Sixth Committee: Summary Record of the 16th 
meeting (UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.16, 14 February 2012); UNGA Department of Public Information, News and 
Media Division, Sixth Committee, 16th Meeting: Praising Draft Texts on Transboundary Harm, Aquifers, 
Allocation of Loss, Delegates Disagree Over Final Forms, Seek Further Examination (UN Doc. GA/L/3464, 22 
October 2013). 
23 The Law of Transboundary Aquifers (UNGA Resolution A/RES/66/104, 13 January 2012), at paragraph 1. 
24 Ibid., at paragraph 3. 
25 Ibid., at paragraph 2. 
further consideration of the law of transboundary aquifers until 2016.26 It also encouraged 
UNESCO-IHP to continue its valuable work.27 Where the outcome did change is in the 
relationship put forward between States interested in taking forward more cooperative 
approaches in the management of transboundary aquifers and the Draft Articles. 
Significantly, the latest resolution makes no reference to the final form of the Draft Articles. 
The resolution, however, commends: µto the attention of Governments the draft articles on 
the law of transboundary aquifers annexed to the present resolution as guidance for bilateral 
or regional agreements and arrangements for the proper management of transboundary 
aquifers¶28 
 
Until this resolution, countries were only commended to µtake into account¶ the Draft Articles 
when discussing bilateral or regional agreements. This latest resolution, however, appears to 
elevate the Draft Articles to the status of µguidance¶ in the negotiation of future bilateral and 
regional transboundary aquifer agreements. This is not simply a change in language or use of 
synonymous wording. Rather, use of the term µguidance¶ suggests both a stronger recognition 
of the Draft Articles by the international community and a more assertive admonition to 
States to abide by the norms contained therein. 
 
Notwithstanding the µguidance¶ language, what started out as a relatively quick process in 
terms of the development of international law, has now slowed down to a crawl. While the 
Draft Articles were drafted in only six years, since 2009 there have been no amendments to 
the proposed norms and there has been little progress toward a consensus on next steps. This 
is particularly evident with respect to the legal form that the Draft Articles should take. The 
international community in 2014 has before it exactly what it had at the beginning of 2009: a 
set of ILC Draft Articles annexed to an UNGA resolution, all of which remain in limbo. 
 
Does this lack of progress on the final form of the Draft Articles suggest that their content is 
premature or ill-conceived? Might it portend the demise of the effort to formulate legal norms 
for the management of transboundary aquifers? Or, does the continued postponement 
intimate an alternative route toward international recognition? The next section of this article 
considers the various options contemplated and deferred by the UNGA in its successive 
debates as to the possible forms that the Draft Articles might take. It also assesses those 
options in the context of transboundary aquifer management. 
 
THE FUTURE FORM OF THE LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS 
 
Despite the apparent lack of progress on the Draft Articles, the debate on their future form is 
far from over and will continue, at least, into the 2016 session of the UNGA Sixth 
Committee. This is because the form that an international legal instrument may take is not 
just a theoretical issue where advocates of soft law versus hard law spend time and effort to 
justify their position.29 Rather, the form can have significant practical relevance and often can 
                                                          
26 Report of the Sixth Committee, The Law of Transboundary Aquifers (UN Doc. A/68/470, 19 November 
2013), at paragraph 3. The UNGA adopted the Report without a vote. UNGA Department of Public Information, 
News and Media Division, Sixty-Eighth General Assembly, Plenary, 68th Meeting: Adoption 21 Sixth 
Committee Resolutions, General Assembly Highlights Significant Achievements in Development of 
International Law (UN Doc. GA/11473, 16 December 2013). 
27 See Report of the Sixth Committee, n. 26 above, at paragraph 2. 
28 Ibid., at paragraph 1 (emphasis added). 
29 On the debate between hard law and soft law see, for instance, S.I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and A. Vihma, 
µ&RPSDULQJ WKH Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Global Hard and Soft Law: An Analytical FUDPHZRUN¶:4 
Regulation & Governance (2009), 400. Soft law in the context of international environmental law has been 
dictate or direct the extent to which the general principles (both substantive and procedural) 
present therein can be used, applied and even enforced.  
 
Against this background, the debates before the UNGA have generated a panoply of options 
for the possible future form of the Draft Articles. Some nations have advocated developing 
the Articles into an independent framework treaty, while others prefer to present the 
principals in the form of guidelines or non-binding recommendations.30 Finally, there are 
some countries that prefer maintaining the status quo, which is effectively what has happened 
until now. Each of these options will now be discussed in turn based, in particular, on the 
most recent discussions that took place before the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee in 
October and November 2013.31 
 
INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL TREATY 
 
The Draft Articles could serve as a basis to negotiate an independent international convention 
on the topic of the law of transboundary aquifers. Similarly to what happened with the UN 
Watercourses Convention, an intergovernmental process could be launched where countries 
would use the text of the Draft Articles as a starting point to negotiate a final agreement. The 
resulting convention would then be signed at an international conference and enter into force 
once the relevant number of ratifications is accrued. 
 
While this option enjoyed several followers in the initial debates on the form of the Draft 
Articles ± even during the drafting of the Articles themselves ± more and more States appear 
to have abandoned this position, albeit for different reasons. These reasons can be broadly 
divided into three categories: legal, political and socio-economic reasons. 
 
Legal Reasons 
Legal reasons not to back the independent convention option include: disagreement over 
whether the Draft Articles actually reflect current law and practice applicable to 
transboundary aquifers; disagreement over whether the Draft Articles collide with other 
applicable international legal instruments; and disagreement over specific provisions of the 
Draft Articles. 
 
With regard to the Draft Articles and the state of the law and the practice of States, the 
positions of Portugal and of the US are instructive. While the former argued that µthe Draft 
Articles are in line with already existing legal regimes governing water and natural resources 
in general¶,32 the latter considered that µmany aspects of the draft articles clearly go beyond 
current law and practice¶.33 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
GLVFXVVHG E\ ) 6LQGLFR µ6RIW /DZ DQG WKH (OXVLYH 4XHVW IRU 6XVWDLQDEOH *OREDO *RYHUQDQFH¶ :3 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2006), 829; and P.-0 'XSX\ µ6RIW /DZ DQG Whe International Law of the 
(QYLURQPHQW¶:2 Michigan Journal of International Law (1991). 
30 See also C. Yamada, Fifth Report on Shared Natural Resources: Transboundary Aquifers (UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/59121, 21 February 2008), at paragraphs 7-8. 
31 Seventeen countries presented written submissions, which can be found at: 
<https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/ga/sixth/68th-session/statements/?cv=1&agenda=7581>. 
32 Statement by Portugal, 68th Session of the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee ± Agenda Item 87: The 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers (22 October 2013), found at: 
<https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703105/portugal-87.pdf>, at 3. 
33 Statement by the United States of America, 68th Session of the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee ± 
Agenda Item 87: The Law of Transboundary Aquifers (22 October 2013), found at: 
<https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703097/us-87.pdf>, at 2 
 In its most recent submission, the US also cautioned against moving toward an independent 
convention because of the possible overlap of authority and proposed norms between the 
Draft Articles and UNWC. According to the US, some of the provisions of the Draft Articles 
would be incompatible with those of the UNWC, thereby creating conflicting obligations and 
fragmenting international water law.34 
 
Raising the possibility that discord over the Draft Articles may spread from its final form to 
its substance, many nations have raised concerns over specific provisions of the Draft 
Articles, questioning their merits, appropriateness, and interpretation. Palestine, for example, 
suggested that it would be unwise to push toward an independent convention when the 
starting point (the Draft Articles) contain a provision on national sovereignty that, in its 
opinion, would take the international community back more than a hundred years to the 
Harmon Doctrine approach to transboundary water management.35 In a different vein, 
Ukraine raised serious concerns with the obligation to not cause significant harm. It 
questioned the interpretation of the descriptor µsignificant¶ and urged further work and 
clarification before taking any steps toward an independent convention. More specifically, it 
questioned the absence of a compensation mechanism for financial losses related to aquifer 
depletion.36 
 
The challenges raised over substantive provisions of the Draft Articles raise a further issue 
that apparently has not been addressed in the discussions before the UN General Assembly 
and its Sixth Committee. If an intergovernmental process were launched toward an 
independent convention, it is by no means certain that the current content of the Draft 
Articles would be retained. On the contrary, considering the questions and concerns presented 
in the most recent discussions over certain core areas (i.e., national sovereignty and 
significant harm) an intergovernmental process could open a Pandora¶V box of substantive 
dissent that might lead either to a watering down of the existing Draft Articles or an impasse 
in achieving consensus, rather than enhancing or adding greater precision to the proposed 
norms. 
 
Political Reasons 
                                                          
34 Ibid, at 2QWKLVSRLQWVHHDOVR20F,QW\UHµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO:DWHU5HVRXUFHV/DZDQGWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ
Commission Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers: A Missed Opportunity for Cross-)HUWLOLVDWLRQ"¶ :3 
International Community Law Review (2011), 237. 
35 Statement by the State of Palestine, 68th Session of the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee ± Agenda 
Item 87: The Law of Transboundary Aquifers (22 October 2013), found at: 
<https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703060/palestine-87.pdf>, at 1. Interestingly, many countries 
actually refer to the principle of national sovereignty as one of the cornerstones of the Draft Articles. See, for 
example, Statement by Uruguay, 68th Session of the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee ± Agenda Item 87: 
The Law of Transboundary Aquifers (22 October 2013), found at: 
<https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703071/uruguay-87.pdf>, at 3, and Statement by Peru, 68th Session 
of the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee ± Agenda Item 87: The Law of Transboundary Aquifers (22 
October 2013), found at: <https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703110/peru-87.pdf>, at 1. National 
sovereignty in the context of the law of transboundary aquifers has led to very different positions, with S. 
McCaffrey, n. 17 above, making the samHSRLQWUDLVHGE\3DOHVWLQHDQG/'HO&DVWLOOR/DERUGHµ7KH/DZRI
7UDQVERXQGDU\ $TXLIHUV DQG WKH %HUOLQ 5XOHV RQ :DWHU 5HVRXUFHV ,/$ ,QWHUSUHWLYH &RPSOHPHQWDULW\¶ LQ: 
UNESCO-IAH-UNEP, Pre-proceedings: ISARM 2010 International Conference Transboundary Aquifers: 
Challenges and New Directions (2010), taking a position more close to the ones presented by the two above-
mentioned Latin American countries. 
36 Statement by Ukraine, 68th Session of the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee ± Agenda Item 87: The 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers (22 October 2013), found at: 
<https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703119/ukraine-87.pdf>. 
Two other reasons against moving towards an independent convention can loosely fall under 
the category of political constraints and can be framed as a question of political support and 
scale. According to the US delegation, a future convention on the law of transboundary 
aquifers µwould [not] garner sufficient support¶.37 The point raised here goes beyond the 
question of support needed in the negotiation process of a possible convention, and moves 
toward the necessary number of ratifications for the possible treaty to enter into force. Given 
that 16 years since its passage by the UNGA, the UNWC is only now barely on the verge of 
garnering the requisite number of ratifications,38 the question of international political support 
for a convention on transboundary aquifers may be particularly valid.39 Certainly, if a country 
strongly believes in the value of an international legal instrument and in an independent 
convention as its form, the lack of support should not prevent that country from considering 
this form altogether. Nevertheless, the lack of support definitely stands out as a political 
challenge that needs to be carefully considered when deciding what strategies are pursued. 
 
A second political challenge to an independent convention pertains to a question of scale. 
There is some disagreement as to whether rules on transboundary aquifer management should 
be developed at the global level, or if they would be more effective if developed at the level 
of specific aquifers. Israel advocates this position and argues that local context must be taken 
into account to the greatest extent, with particular regard given to local hydrogeological and 
political relationships between the countries overlying a transboundary aquifer.40 Similarly, 
Guatemala supports a µlocal solutions¶ approach.41 
 
In response to this latter political challenge, the idiom that all politics are local is apropos. 
Moreover, the fact that the politics and law of transboundary aquifers are very much 
intertwined can be readily acknowledged. Nevertheless, there is evidence that international 
legal frameworks can accommodate local decision making and provide for tailored solutions 
to local problems. Multilateral environmental agreements are often referred to as framework 
treaties,42 precisely because they provide a common platform upon which to build at the bi-
national or regional level.43 Portugal acknowledges this option and argues that a future 
convention should be flexible enough to allow States to establish specific regimes suitable to 
their contexts.44 
 
Socio-Economic Reasons 
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40 Statement by Israel, 68th Session of the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee ± Agenda Item 87: The Law 
of Transboundary Aquifers (22 October 2013), found at: 
<https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703122/israel-87.pdf>, at 2. 
41 Statement by Guatemala, 68th Session of the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee ± Agenda Item 87: The 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers (22 October 2013), found at: 
<https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703107/guatemala-87.pdf>, at 2. 
42 Two examples are the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Rio de Janeiro, 9 May 
1992, in force 21 March 1994), and the Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in 
force 29 December 1993). 
43 Even within the few specific treaties on transboundary aquifers, an example can be found. Article 13 of the 
Guarani Aquifer Agreement, n. 6 above, provides clear legal grounds for specific measures to be adopted in case 
actions need to take place at a local level in the management of the transboundary aquifer. 
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The last type of reasons against moving toward a convention can be categorized as socio-
economic. Japan hints at this when explaining that despite its past approach favouring a 
Convention, it now sees this option losing momentum due to the µsensitivity¶ of certain 
countries to µparticular issues¶.45 Guatemala uses clearer language when it asserts that it finds 
itself against moving toward an independent convention because of the panoply of economic, 
political and environmental interests related to the management of transboundary aquifers. 
Fundamentally, Guatemala argues that, because of socio-economic problems related to the 
use of groundwater resources in a transboundary aquifer context, their management does not 
warrant a global treaty.46 
 
To paraphrase the idiom related to politics, all socio-economic problems also are local 
problems. But just as in the political context, an international approach does not necessarily 
negate recognition of unique local challenges and opportunities for local solutions. 
Nevertheless, these socio-economic concerns further suggest that there is little appetite for 
the Draft Articles to be translated into a global independent convention. When taken one at a 
time, there may be ways to discuss and overcome the various legal, political and socio-
economic challenges raised. Taken together, though, these challenges have created a 
formidable obstacle that is driving countries away from this form. It is therefore necessary 
and advisable to move on and consider the other available options regarding the future form 
of the Draft Articles: their adoption as a declaration of principles or retaining them in their 
current form. 
 
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES 
 
In his final report, Ambassador Yamada noted: µWhile the positions of Governments remain 
divided, the Special Rapporteur has noticed that some Governments have shifted from 
supporting a legally binding convention to a non-binding document.¶47 A second option 
regarding the future form of the Draft Articles therefore is for them to be presented as a 
declaration of principles. The one immediate difference that such a form would have from 
their adoption as an independent convention would be their legal nature. While a declaration 
endorsed by a UN General Assembly resolution would not be legally binding on the member 
States, a convention would be obligatory under international law. In addition, as a declaration 
of principles, it would be far easier for an instrument to reflect the current content of the Draft 
Articles. As noted earlier, if countries were to open an intergovernmental process to negotiate 
an international convention based on the Draft Articles, it is possible that the content of the 
Draft Article could be watered down. This risk would likely be lessened if a declaration were 
adopted. To some extent, there is a political reason for this. Many countries who have 
objected to the Draft Articles becoming an independent convention have done so because 
they oppose certain provisions becoming hardened or obligatory by being incorporated in a 
global convention. It may well be that these countries would soften their objections if the 
final form is aspirational and imposes no direct liability or obligation. Finally, in contrast to 
those who frame the declaration approach as a defensive strategy intended to prevent the 
Draft Articles from becoming binding under a global convention, many advocates for a 
declaration see it as a constructive first step in the process toward a future convention.48 This 
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47 See C. Yamada, n. 30 above, at paragraph 8. 
48 See, e.g., Statement by Portugal, n. 3233 above, at 3. 
latter group appears to recognize the challenge of achieving consensus while maintaining 
their objective of an independent, global convention. 
 
Recognizing the need for compromise, Uruguay, on behalf of the Guarani Aquifer Agreement 
countries, considered a declaration of principles as the best option for the future form of the 
draft articles.49 Similarly recognizing µthat some member states showed unwillingness to 
negotiate for a future convention based on the text of the draft articles with their own 
legitimate interests¶, Japan shares this position.50 However, what is not entirely clear is 
whether using the Draft Articles as principles and guidelines even requires a new declaration. 
This takes us to the last of the three options regarding the form of the future draft articles: 
maintaining the status quo. 
 
MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO 
 
A status quo approach suggests no action whatsoever. As seen earlier, the language found in 
the most recent UNGA resolution on the law of transboundary aquifers has experienced a 
mild but potentially significant change as compared to the two prior resolutions. States are 
encouraged not merely to take into account the Draft Articles when negotiating a bilateral or 
regional agreement for the management of a transboundary aquifer. Rather, they are now 
commended to use them as guidance in their negotiation. Accordingly, it is arguable that the 
status quo has already changed. Nevertheless, while most of the countries engaged in the 
recent debates at the UN General Assembly seem favourable to this language modification,51 
a considerable number of States appeared to oppose any further action, including the adoption 
of a non-legally binding declaration of principles.  
 
A few of the arguments repeated by some of the countries justifying the status quo include 
concerns about the µmaturity¶ of the Draft Articles. Guatemala and Malaysia, for example, 
both argue that States should be given more time to familiarize themselves with the Draft 
Articles before having to decide whether the provisions therein are worthy to be taken into 
account in possible future negotiations.52 This argument raises the question of awareness and 
understanding of the Draft Articles. As important as groundwater governance and 
transboundary aquifer management may be, it is still a rather complex and often invisible 
matter for many governments. The two prior UNGA resolutions referenced the capacity 
building work of UNESCO-IHP in the field of transboundary aquifer management. That 
effort has not been limited to increasing the scientific knowledge of transboundary aquifers, 
which is still referred to by some countries as insufficient,53 but also has focused on the legal 
and institutional options available to countries. The role of UNESCO-IHP is, therefore, 
crucial for the UNGA process, since the organization is called to clarify the Draft Articles 
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and make them more visible. Accordingly, a discussion about the relevance of the future form 
of the Draft Articles is strongly allied with the work of UNESCO-IHP. 
 
A second reason put forward by States to advocate for the status quo is that the current form 
of the Draft Articles, as annexed to a UN General Assembly Resolution, provides the 
necessary flexibility for the Draft Articles to accommodate the local needs and characteristics 
of different transboundary aquifers.54 For example, the US argued that locally unique 
hydrological, climatic, economic, social, cultural and other factors will require a tailored 
approach to transboundary aquifer management.55 Since this argument is akin to the one 
considered in the political objection context above, it suffices to say that such concerns do not 
fully rationalize maintaining the status quo. 
 
THE PROTOCOL OPTION 
 
Before concluding the discussion of options for the final form of the Draft Articles, it is 
noteworthy to at least mention a fourth possibility that, while promoted by some 
organizations, never seemed to gain any traction at the UN. In some circles, the final form of 
the Draft Articles has been proposed as a protocol to the UNWC.56 The chief justifications 
proffered for this option include the need for a holistic approach to the codification and 
development of international water law, as well as a coordinated effort for the management of 
interrelated related surface and ground water resources.57 It is unclear why this option did not 
garner much attention at the UN. Nevertheless, given the current antipathy of the UN member 
State representatives in the UNGA Sixth Committee to a formal treaty, it is unlikely that this 
approach could garner any support. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE FUTURE FORM 
 
In the grand scheme of the development of international law, the first three options all can be 
regarded as reasonable possibilities. They are not, however, equally realistic or likely to result 
IURP WKH 81*$¶V GHOLEHUDWLRQV. Legal, political, and socio-economic hurdles make the 
success of the first option highly improbable with most countries favouring either the 
declaration or the status quo approach. This reality brings into question whether the form that 
the Draft Articles may finally take could have an impact on their future relevance. This is the 
focus of the following section. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FUTURE FORM AND THE FUTURE 
RELEVANCE OF THE DRAFT ARTICLES 
 
METHODICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
:KLOH WKH81*$¶VDSSURDFK LQ DVVHVVLQJ WKH'UDIW$UWLFOHVRQ WKH /DZ RI7UDQVERXQGDU\
Aquifers may be frustratingly sluggish, it is possible that, to some extent, the pace of 
development is intentional. Although the Draft Articles were composed with relative speed ± 
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in contrast to the 25 years it took to craft the draft articles leading to the UNWC, the Draft 
Articles were prepared in less than six years ± they were not achieved without controversy.58  
Accordingly, in order to prevent the wholesale rejection of the Draft Articles, some, like 
Ambassador Yamada, counselled that the UNGA should take a slow but methodical approach 
to the development of global standards and norms for managing transboundary groundwater 
resources. To generate eventual acceptance and support for the principles incorporated in the 
Draft Articles, Ambassador Yamada suggested that the Draft Articles be tabled by the UNGA 
so as to minimize the pressure that binding norms would engender and allow countries to test 
run the norms proposed in the Draft Articles ,W ZDV $PEDVVDGRU <DPDGD¶V KRSH WKDW WKH
norms articulated in the Draft Articles might eventually rise to the level of custom, regardless 
of whether they would ever be codified in a binding legal instrument.59 This is the tactic that, 
while not intentionally, has been successfully pursued by proponents of the UN Draft Articles 
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.60 This is also the option 
that most countries in the recent 2013 debate on the law of transboundary aquifers at the UN 
Sixth Committee appeared to favour. 
 
Given the dearth of experience with managing transboundary aquifers, such an organic and 
measured approach may be justified. On the one hand, it would provide nations the 
opportunity to experiment with the norms and adapt them to locally-specific or unique 
circumstances. More importantly, as aquifer riparians begin to utilize, abide by, and modify 
these principles, it would create the space in which their actions could evolve into 
demonstrable State practice and, thereby, help create customary international legal norms. 
 
While it is still too early to assess the outcome definitively, the Draft Articles have already 
begun to influence State practice and the development of international law. For example, the 
Guarani Aquifer Agreement explicitly references Resolution 63/124 in its preamble.61 It also 
adopts a number of the concepts and norms contained in the Draft Articles, including the 
principles of sovereignty, cooperation, no significant harm, exchange of data and 
information, and prior notification of planned works with transboundary implications.62 
 
Likewise, the 2009 Bamako Declaration for the Iullemeden Aquifer System directly 
acknowledges Resolution 63/124,63 while the related Memorandum of Understanding 
implementing the Declaration adopts the principles of equitable and reasonable use, exchange 
of data and information, and prior notification of planned works with transboundary 
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implications, as well as other more progressive norms focusing on human welfare and 
environmental protection.64 
 
Possibly the most significant reference to the Draft Articles can be found in the UNECE 
Model Provisions on Transboundary Groundwaters, which were adopted by the Meeting of 
the Parties to the 1992 UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Convention on the 
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.65 In the 
commentary appended to the Model Provisions, the UNECE states that: 
 
The present exercise [the Model Provisions on Transboundary Groundwaters] builds on 
that instrument [the Draft Articles] with a view to providing concrete guidance for 
implementing, with regard to groundwater, the 1992 Convention on the Protection and 
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes ([UNECE] Water 
Convention) in the light of the lessons learnt and the experience gained from the 
implementation of the Convention.66 
 
It is significant that the Model Provisions constitute an instrument intended to provide 
guidance on the subject of transboundary aquifers. Hence, the preamble to Decision VI/2, in 
which the UNECE adopted the Model Provisions, explicitly µ>U@ecogniz[es] the need for 
providing specific non-binding guidance for the implementation of the Convention with 
regard to groundwater and facilitating the application of the principles of the Convention to 
transboundary groundwaters¶.67 Moreover, one of the stated goals of the Model Provisions is 
to assist µStates sharing transboundary groundwaters intersected by State boundaries or 
sharing transboundary surface waters linked with groundwaters in drawing up specific 
agreements addressing the sustainable use, management and protection of those groundwaters 
through cooperation¶.68 
 
It is interesting to note that the UNECE Water Convention is now open to all UN Member 
States.69 This effectively means that a legal instrument stemming from such a Convention, 
albeit in the form of a decision of the Meeting of the Parties, could be relevant for a wider 
group of countries than those that currently enjoy UNECE membership. The close 
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relationship between the Draft Articles and the Model Provisions implies that, were the latter 
to be followed by more countries, the Draft Articles themselves could be deemed to have a 
broader impact. However, the real point is once again whether the current (and any future) 
form of the Draft Articles requires such sophisticated linkages to enhance its legal effects. 
 
NORMATIVE PROPOSITIONS, LEGAL EFFECTS, LEGALLY BINDING 
INSTRUMENTS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
As noted above, the Draft Articles in their current form have already had some influence on 
the development of a number of international instruments. In addition, they have also been 
referred to by a number of national courts, including the Supreme Court of Justice in Costa 
Rica.70 As such, the Draft Articles already have had some impact on State practice. Uruguay, 
speaking at the 2013 UN deliberations on behalf of the signatories to the Guarani Aquifer 
Agreement, made a compelling point that the Draft Articles in their current form constitute 
µnormative propositions¶.71 This contention would not contradict the position of those 
countries that, quite rightly, assert that in their current form, the Draft Articles are not legally 
binding.72 Regardless, given how international law can emerge and evolve, it is reasonable to 
ask whether a non-legally binding international instrument can, nonetheless, have legal 
effects. Practice in the field of international environmental law, especially in decisions taken 
by conferences of the parties (COPs) to multilateral environmental agreements, suggests that 
this question can be answered in the affirmative.73 
 
The logical questions resulting from this assessment would then be: what is meant by legal 
effects, and what does Uruguay mean when it refers to the Draft Articles as being normative 
propositions? It can be argued that the Draft Articles provide a platform of substantive and 
procedural rules that States can use as guidance when negotiating an agreement to manage 
their transboundary aquifers. The effects are legal insofar as what is suggested in the Draft 
Articles, as well as in the Model Provisions, constitutes a normative framework. The legal 
effects are not legally binding because they are not enforceable before any court. If a country 
does not use the Draft Articles as guidance or does not take them into account when 
negotiating a transboundary aquifer agreement, it would not be acting contrary to 
international law. Moreover, its actions would not trigger or impose any State responsibility 
or liability upon itself. In other words, legal effects can arise from a UN General Assembly 
Resolution that provides for a declaration of principles, in a way similar to COP decisions. 
 
Considering the above, it is appropriate to question whether the relevance and legal impact of 
the Draft Articles would be any different if they were translated into a fully-fledged treaty. 
On the one hand, according to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the answer would be 
affirmative where a convention is in force and imposes obligations upon ratifying States.74 It 
is clear that substantive and procedural obligations present in a treaty are binding upon the 
States party to that treaty and that breaching them would constitute a violation of 
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international law. On the other hand, the legal nature of an obligation under international law 
depends also on two other considerations. 
 
First, the wording of that obligation can determine whether it is legally binding only in 
principle, or also in practice. If a treaty obligation is drafted in very general or ambiguous 
terms, it may make a breach very difficult to prove and State responsibility almost impossible 
to establish before a court. Second, and more relevant to the management of transboundary 
aquifers, obligations are legally binding where they reflect customary international law.75 
Where an obligation reflects customary international law, it does not matter whether the 
provision embodying the obligation is found in a legally binding instrument, a non-binding 
UNGA Resolution, or a non-binding COP Decision. That obligation will have legally 
significant consequences. 
 
Accordingly, the question is whether the norms contained in the Draft Articles reflect 
customary international law in the field of transboundary aquifer management. This is where 
the debate is probably most heated and evident, for example, in the diverging opinions of 
Portugal and the US discussed above. 
 
The Draft Articles, however, contain at least one key obligation that is widely acknowledged 
as a customary norm of international law: the obligation not to cause significant harm to 
neighbouring countries.76 While it has never been specifically applied in the context of a 
transboundary aquifer dispute, the principle is widely accepted as part of international water 
law and appears in some form in every transboundary aquifer agreement to date.77 
 
In addition, the Draft Articles contain a number of principles that appear to be emerging 
customary international legal norms applicable to the management of transboundary aquifers. 
In particular, the obligation to regularly exchange data and information,78 and the corollary 
duty to monitor and, where possible, generate additional data,79 are found in a number of 
contemporary transboundary aquifer arrangements.80 Similarly, the obligation of prior 
notification of planned activities81 is also found in various relevant agreements.82 
 
Another procedural obligation that seems to have acquired customary international law status 
in the context of minimizing significant transboundary harm is the obligation to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment. It is unclear, however, the extent to which this customary 
norm is obligatory in the context of transboundary aquifers. Recent case law by the 
International Court of Justice can be interpreted as raising the legal bar of such obligation to 
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the level of customary international law, but only in the context of proposed industrial 
activities.83 Furthermore, the fact that the Draft Articles reference environmental impact 
assessment in Articles 15 and 18,84 but without a clear-cut requirement to undertake such an 
activity, raises doubts as to the customary nature of this obligation in the context of 
transboundary aquifer management. The same can be argued when analyzing the provisions 
of the Guarani Aquifer Agreement, where the possibility of an environmental impact 
assessment is mentioned without any binding requirements.85 Despite the difficulties in 
determining when an obligation acquires customary international law status, the form of the 
legal instrument in which they are found does not necessarily impact their applicability, or 
even enforceability. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The progression of legal development is a dynamic process that often requires years to 
evolve. Hence, the impact and effectiveness of the Draft Articles may not necessarily be 
dependent on their codification and implementation as a binding legal instrument, or even on 
agreement as non-binding guidelines. Rather their true impact will be measured in relation to 
the degree to which States embrace the various principles and norms contained in the articles 
as their practice. In addition, it will depend on the ability and desire of States to accept and 
employ those articles as a framework for more detailed bilateral and regional aquifer 
agreements. In the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt, µThere are many ways of going forward, 
but only one way of standing still.¶ 
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